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Abstract—Recent advances in hardware design have demon-
strated mechanisms allowing a wide range of low-level secu-
rity policies (or micro-policies) to be expressed using rules on
metadata tags. We propose a methodology for defining and
reasoning about such tag-based reference monitors in terms of
a high-level “symbolic machine,” and we use this methodology
to define and formally verify micro-policies for dynamic sealing,
compartmentalization, control-flow integrity, and memory safety;
in addition, we show how to use the tagging mechanism to
protect its own integrity. For each micro-policy, we prove by
refinement that the symbolic machine instantiated with the
policy’s rules embodies a high-level specification characterizing a
useful security property. Last, we show how the symbolic machine
itself can be implemented in terms of a hardware rule cache and
a software controller.
Index Terms—security; dynamic enforcement; reference mon-
itors; low-level code; tagged hardware architecture; metadata;
formal verification; refinement; machine-checked proofs; Coq;
dynamic sealing; compartmentalization; isolation; least privilege;
memory safety; control-flow integrity
1 Introduction
Today’s computer systems are distressingly insecure. However,
many of their vulnerabilities can be avoided if low-level code
is constrained to obey sensible safety and security properties.
Ideally, such properties might be enforced statically, but for
obtaining pervasive guarantees all the way to the level of
running machine code it is often more practical to detect
violations dynamically using a reference monitor [3], [13],
[29]. Monitors have been used for many tasks, including
enforcement of memory safety [27] or control-flow integrity
(CFI) [1], taint tracking, fine-grained information-flow control
(IFC), and isolation of untrusted code [33], [35]. They are
sometimes implemented in software [13], but this can signifi-
cantly degrade performance and/or cause designers to settle for
rough approximations of the intended policy that are potentially
vulnerable to attack [10], [14]. Hardware acceleration is thus an
attractive alternative, especially in an era of cheap transistors.
Many designs for hardware monitors have been proposed,
with early designs focusing on enforcing single, hard-wired
security policies [30] and later ones evolving toward more
programmable mechanisms that allow quicker adaptation to a
shifting attack landscape. Recent work has gone yet further
in this direction by defining a generic, fully programmable
hardware/software architecture for tag-based monitoring on a
conventional processor extended with a Programmable Unit
for Metadata Processing (PUMP) [11].
The PUMP architecture associates each piece of data in
the system with a metadata tag describing its provenance
or purpose (e.g., “this is an instruction,” “this came from
the network,” “this is secret,” “this is sealed with key k”),
propagates this metadata as instructions are executed, and
checks that policy rules are obeyed throughout the computation.
It provides great flexibility for defining policies and puts no
arbitrary limitations on the size of the metadata and the number
of policies supported. Hardware simulations show [11] that
an Alpha processor extended with PUMP hardware achieves
performance comparable to dedicated hardware when simulta-
neously enforcing memory safety, CFI, and taint tracking on a
standard benchmark suite. Monitoring imposes modest impact
on runtime (typically under 10%) and power ceiling (less than
10%), in return for some increase in energy usage (typically
under 60%) and chip area (110%).
Coding correct, efficient policies to run on the PUMP ar-
chitecture can be nontrivial. Indeed, it is often challenging
even to give a high-level specification for a policy of interest.
In prior work, we showed how to address this challenge for
one specific policy by giving a mechanized correctness proof
for an information-flow control (IFC) policy running on an
idealized machine incorporating PUMP-like hardware [4]. This
proof is organized around three layers of machines sharing
a common core instruction set: an abstract machine whose
instruction semantics has a specific IFC policy built in; an
intermediate symbolic machine that allows for different dynamic
IFC mechanisms to be expressed using a simple domain-
specific language; and a concrete machine, where the IFC
policy is implemented by a software controller that interacts
with low-level tag-management mechanisms of the hardware. A
noninterference property is established at the abstract machine
level and transferred to the other levels via two steps of
refinement.
In this paper, we extend this IFC-specific proof to a generic
framework for formalizing and verifying arbitrary policies
enforceable by the PUMP architecture. We use the term micro-
policies for such instruction-level security-monitoring mecha-
nisms based on fine-grained metadata. We use this methodology
to formalize and verify a diverse collection of micro-policies
using the Coq proof assistant.
The heart of our methodology is a generic symbolic machine
(middle layer in Figure 1) that serves both as a programming
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Figure 1. System overview
interface—abstracting away unnecessary implementation de-
tails and providing a convenient platform for micro-policy
designers—and as an intermediate step in correctness proofs.
This machine is parameterized by a symbolic micro-policy that
expresses tag propagation and checking in terms of structured
mathematical objects rather than low-level concrete represen-
tations. Each symbolic micro-policy consists of (i) sets of
metadata tags that are used to label every piece of data in
the machine’s memory and registers (including the program
counter); (ii) a transfer function that uses both the current
opcode and the tags on the pc, on the current instruction, and on
the instruction operands to determine whether the operation is
permitted and, if it is, to specify how the pc and the instruction’s
result should be tagged in the next machine state; and (iii) a
set of monitor services that can be invoked by user code. For
example, in a micro-policy for dynamic sealing (a language-
based protection mechanism in the style of perfect symmetric
encryption [23], described below in §4) the set of tags used
for registers and memory might be {Data, Key k, Sealed k},
where Data is used to tag ordinary data values, Sealed k is
used to tag values sealed with the key k, and Key k denotes
a key that can be used for sealing and unsealing values. The
transfer function for this micro-policy would allow, for example,
arithmetic operations on values tagged Data but deny them on
data tagged Sealed or Key. Monitor services are provided to
allow user programs to create new keys and to seal and unseal
data values with given keys.
We instantiate this symbolic machine with a diverse set
of security micro-policies: (a) dynamic sealing [23], [31];
(b) compartmentalization, which sandboxes untrusted code and
allows it to be run alongside trusted code [32]; (c) control-flow
integrity (CFI), which prevents code-reuse attacks such as
return-oriented programming [1]; and (d) memory safety, which
prevents temporal and spatial violations for heap-allocated
data [11]. The intended behavior of each micro-policy is
specified by an abstract machine (top layer in Figure 1), which
gives a clear characterization of the micro-policy’s behavior
as seen by a user-level programmer. The abstract machine
enforces the invariants of the micro-policy by omitting insecure
behaviors from its transition function: a program that violates
the micro-policy gets stuck. Where appropriate, we prove
that the abstract machine for a micro-policy satisfies standard
properties from the literature. For example, for the CFI micro-
policy we prove a variant of the original CFI property proposed
by Abadi et al. [1], while for our compartmentalization micro-
policy we prove a single-step property drawn from Wahbe et
al.’s original software fault isolation (SFI) model [32]. For
each micro-policy, we prove backward refinement between the
abstract and symbolic machines, i.e., every possible symbolic
machine behavior is a valid abstract behavior—hence, the
symbolic machine always fail-stops on policy violations.
Finally, we extend this methodology to the hardware level
by showing how instances of the symbolic machine can be
realized on a low-level concrete machine, a minimalist RISC
ISA extended with the key mechanisms of the PUMP hardware
architecture [11] (bottom layer in Figure 1). Every word of
data in this machine is associated with a piece of metadata
called a tag—itself a full machine word that can, in particular,
hold a pointer to an arbitrary data structure in memory. The
interpretation of tags is left entirely to software; the hardware
simply propagates tags from operands to results according to
software-defined concrete rules. To propagate tags efficiently,
the processor is augmented with a rule cache that operates
in parallel with instruction execution. On a rule cache miss,
control is transferred to a trusted miss handler which, given the
tags of the instruction’s arguments, decides whether the current
operation should be allowed and, if so, computes appropriate
tags for its results. It then adds this set of argument and
result tags to the rule cache so that when the same situation
is encountered in the future, the rule can be applied without
slowing down the processor.
Each micro-policy can be implemented at the concrete
level by providing machine code for the transfer function
and monitor services, along with a concrete bit-encoding for
symbolic tags. This monitor code can make use of a handful
of privileged instructions of the concrete machine, allowing
it to inspect and change tags and to update the cache. For all
micro-policies, it is obviously necessary to protect the integrity
of the monitor’s code and data, and to prevent user programs
from invoking the privileged instructions. We show that we
can achieve this protection using only the tagging mechanism
itself (no special kernel protection modes, page table tricks,
etc.). We also give a generic proof of backward refinement
between the symbolic and concrete machines, modulo some
assumptions characterizing the behavior of the micro-policy-
specific concrete code. Composing this refinement with the
abstract-symbolic refinement described above gives a proof that
the concrete machine always fail-stops on policy violations. For
CFI, we additionally show that the corresponding higher-level
property [1] is preserved by refinement, allowing us to transfer
it to any valid implementation of the micro-policy.
Our focus throughout is on proving safety properties, which
we formalize as backward refinements: the observable behaviors
of the lower-level machine are also legal behaviors of the
higher-level machine, and in particular the lower-level machine
fail-stops whenever the higher-level machine does. Liveness,
or forward refinement (the lower-level machine only fail-stops
when the higher-level one does), is also a desirable property;
indeed, a completely inert machine (i.e., one that never steps)
at the symbolic or concrete level would satisfy backward
refinement but would be of no use. However, full forward
refinement doesn’t always hold for our micro-policies. In
particular, resource constraints that we prefer to ignore at the
abstract level (e.g., word size and memory capacity) become
visible at the symbolic or concrete level when tags and monitor
data structures are made explicit. Fortunately, in practice it is
reasonable to check that the lower-level machines are “live
enough” by testing.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we introduce a
generic symbolic machine (§2-§3) for conveniently defining and
effectively verifying a wide range of micro-policies for a simple
RISC processor. Second, we use the symbolic machine to give
formal descriptions and verified tag-based implementations of
four security micro-policies: dynamic sealing (§4), compart-
mentalization (§5), control-flow integrity (§6), and memory
safety (§7). Third, we define a concrete machine incorporating
a PUMP cache (§8) and sketch how to construct concrete
monitors implementing symbolic micro-policies. And finally
(§9), we give a generic construction showing how tags can be
used to protect the concrete monitor itself from attack, together
with a generic proof (parameterized by some assumptions about
the micro-policy-specific monitor code) that this construction is
correct. We discuss related work specific to each micro-policy in
the relevant section (§4–§7), saving more general related work
on micro-policies and reference monitors for §10. We outline
future work in §11. The appendices present additional technical
details; further details can be in a long version, available
electronically.
2 Basic Machine
We begin by introducing the simplified RISC instruction set
architecture that forms the common core of all the machines
throughout the paper. This basic machine has a fixed word size
and a fixed set of general-purpose registers plus a program
counter (pc) register. It features a small collection of familiar
instructions
inst ::= Nop | Const i rd | Mov rs rd | Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
Load rp rd | Store rp rs | Jump r | Jal r | Bnz r i | Halt
where ⊕ ∈ {+,−,×,=,≤, . . .}. Const i rd puts a constant
i into register rd. Mov rs rd copies the contents of rs into
rd. Jump and Jal (jump-and-link) are unconditional indirect
jumps, while Bnz r i branches to a fixed offset i (relative to
the current pc) if register r is nonzero. Each instruction is
encoded in a word.
A basic machine state is a tuple (mem, reg, pc) of a word-
addressable memory mem (a partial function from words to
words), a register file reg (a function from register names to
words), and a pc value (a word). Note that the memory is a
partial function; trying to address outside of the valid memory
(by trying to fetch the next instruction from an invalid address,
or loading from or storing to one) halts the machine. A typical
step rule for this machine is written like this:
mem[pc] = i decode i = Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
reg[r1]=w1 reg[r2]=w2 reg′=reg[rd←w1 ⊕ w2]
(mem, reg, pc)→ (mem, reg′, pc+1) (BINOP)
Let’s read this rule in detail. Looking up the memory word
at address pc yields the word i, which should correspond to
some instruction (i.e., an element of the inst set defined above)
via partial function decode. In this case, that instruction is
Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd. Registers r1 and r2 contain the operands
w1 and w2. The notation reg[rd←w1 ⊕ w2] denotes a partial
function that maps rd to w1 ⊕ w2 and behaves like reg on
all other arguments. The next machine state is calculated by
updating the register file, incrementing the pc, and leaving the
memory unchanged.
The step rule for the Store instruction is similar. (The nota-
tion mem[wp←ws] is defined only when mem[wp] is defined;
i.e., it fails if wp is not a legal address in mem. This ensures
that the set of addressable memory locations remains fixed as
the machine steps.)
mem[pc] = i decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp]=wp reg[rs]=ws mem′=mem[wp←ws]
(mem, reg, pc)→ (mem′, reg, pc+1) (STORE)
Subroutine calls are implemented by the Jal instruction, which
saves the return address to a general-purpose register ra. Returns
from subroutines are just Jumps through the ra register.
mem[pc] = i decode i = Jal r
reg[r] = pc′ reg′ = reg[ra←pc+1]
(mem, reg, pc)→ (mem, reg′, pc′) (JAL)
3 Symbolic Machine
The symbolic machine is the keystone of our methodology,
embodying our micro-policy programming model. It allows
micro-policies to be expressed and reasoned about in terms of
high-level programs written in Gallina, Coq’s internal functional
programming language, abstracting away irrelevant details
about how they are implemented on concrete low-level hard-
ware and providing an appropriate level of abstraction for
reasoning about their security properties. In this section, we give
just the bare definition of the symbolic machine; §4 illustrates
how its features are used.
The symbolic machine shares the same general organization
as the basic machine from §2. Its definition is abstracted
on several parameters that are provided by the micro-policy
designer, collectively forming a symbolic micro-policy: (1) A
collection of symbolic tags, which are used to label instructions
and data. (2) A partial function transfer, which is invoked on
each step of the machine to propagate tags from the current
machine state to the next one. (3) A partial function get service
mapping addresses to pairs of a symbolic monitor service (a
partial function on machine states) and a symbolic tag that
can be used to restrict access to that service. (4) A type EX of
extra machine state for use by the monitor services, plus an
initial value for this extra state.
Symbolic states (mem, reg, pc, extra) consist of a memory,
a register file, a program counter, and a piece of extra state.
The memory, registers, and pc hold symbolic atoms written
w@t, where w (the “payload”) is a machine word and t is
a symbolic tag. The tag parts are not separately addressable;
they are only accessible to the transfer function and monitor
services, not to user programs.1
The symbolic step rules call the transfer function to decide
whether the step is allowed by the micro-policy and, if so,
how the tags should be updated in the next machine state. The
transfer function is passed a 6-tuple containing the current
opcode plus the tags from the current pc, current instruction,
and the inputs to the current instruction (up to three, depending
on the opcode). It returns a pair containing a tag for the next
pc and a tag for the instruction’s result, if any. For example,
here is the symbolic rule for the Binop instruction:
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd
reg[r1]=w1@t1 reg[r2]=w2@t2 reg[rd]= @td
transfer(Binop⊕, tpc, ti, t1, t2, td) = (t
′
pc, t
′
d)
reg′ = reg[rd←(w1 ⊕ w2)@t′d]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(BINOP)
As in the basic machine, looking up the memory word at
address wpc (the payload part of the current pc value) yields
the atom i@ti; decoding its payload part yields the instruction
Binop⊕ r1 r2 rd. Registers r1 and r2 contain the operands w1
and w2, with tags t1 and t2, and the current tag on the result
register rd is td. The payload part of the current contents of rd
doesn’t matter, since it’s about to be overwritten; we indicate
this with the wildcard pattern . Passing all these tags to the
transfer function yields tags t′pc and t
′
d for the next pc and the
new contents of rd. Since transfer is a partial function, it may
not return anything at all for a given 6-tuple of opcode and
tags. If it doesn’t—i.e., if the next step would cause a policy
violation—then none of the step rules will apply and the current
machine state will be stuck. (For simplicity, we assume here that
policy violations are fatal; various error-recovery mechanisms
could also be used [16], [21].) Passing td, the tag on the old
contents of the target register, to the transfer function allows it
to see what kind of data is being overwritten. This information
is useful for implementing dynamic information-flow policies
like “no sensitive upgrade” [4].
To illustrate how a transfer function might behave, consider
how the symbolic machine might be used to implement a
very simple taint-propagation micro-policy. Symbolic tags are
drawn from the set {>,⊥}, representing tainted and untainted
values. The transfer function is written to ensure that, on each
step of the machine, any result that is influenced by tainted
values is itself tainted. E.g., it might include this clause for
the Binop opcode
transfer(Binop⊕, tpc,−, t1, t2,−) = (tpc, t1 ∨ t2)
where t1 ∨ t2 denotes the max of t1 and t2, where ⊥ < >. For
this policy, the ti and td tags don’t matter, which we indicate
by writing a dummy value “−”.
1We use the term “user code” for all code in the system that is not part
of the micro-policy monitor, including OS-level code such as schedulers and
device drivers.
The generic symbolic rule for Store is similar:
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp]=wp@tp reg[rs]=ws@ts mem[wp]= @td
transfer(Store, tpc, ti, tp, ts, td) = (t′pc, t
′
d)
mem′ = mem[wp←ws@t′d]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem′, reg, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(STORE)
The symbolic machine’s step relation includes a similarly
augmented version of each of the step rules of the basic machine
(see §B for a complete listing). In addition, there is one new
step rule for handling calls to monitor services, which applies
when the pc is at a service entry point—i.e., an address for
which the get service function is defined.
get service wpc = (f, ti)
transfer(Service, tpc, ti,−,−,−) = (−,−)
f(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra) = (mem′, reg′, pc′, extra′)
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem′, reg′, pc′, extra′)
(SVC)
Here, get service returns the monitor service itself (the function
f ), plus a tag ti. The call to transfer checks that this service
is permitted, given the tag on the current pc. The last three
inputs to transfer are set to the dummy value “−”, and the
outputs are not used, since we only care whether the operation
is allowed or not. The Service “opcode” is a special value that
is just used for querying the transfer function about service
routines. Finally, the rule invokes f to carry out the actual
work of the service routine. The behavior of f itself is now
completely up to the micro-policy designer: it is given the
complete symbolic machine state as argument, and it returns
an entire new machine state as result. In particular, some of the
service routines for the policies described below will modify
the tags in the memory. Also, user code will typically get to the
service routine entry point by executing a Jal, and the service
routine is responsible for resetting the pc to the return address
stored in register ra by the Jal. Allowing service routines to
be arbitrary partial functions from machine states to machine
states reflects the fact that, at the concrete level, service routine
code runs with a high level of privilege.
To streamline proofs about the micro-policies in later sec-
tions, we divide the symbolic tags into four distinct sets that are
used in different parts of the symbolic machine: tags from the
set Tm are used for labeling words in memory, Tr for registers,
Tpc for the pc, and Ts for monitor services. The definition
of the transfer function must conform to these conventions;
for example, when propagating tags for Binop, the three last
arguments t1, t2, and td should belong to Tr and the result tag
t′d should also be in Tr. This separation allows some policy
invariants to be maintained “by typechecking,” obviating the
need to maintain them explicitly in proofs and easing the
burden of formal policy verification.
As we will see in the following sections, each micro-policy
has complete freedom to treat tags as if they are associated with
the contents of memory locations or registers (pc included)
or as if they are associated with the memory locations or
registers themselves. Both points of view are valid and useful:
micro-policies like dynamic sealing and taint tracking associate
metadata only with contents, while CFI uses tags to distinguish
the memory locations containing instructions and the sources
and targets of indirect jumps, while using the pc tag to track
execution history (the sources of indirect jumps). In fact, some
micro-policies mix the two points of view: IFC associates tags
with memory and register contents, but the pc tracks execution
history (implicit flows), while memory safety tags memory
locations with compound tags that contain a part associated
with the contents and a part associated with the location.
4 Sealing Micro-Policy
Now it’s time to build micro-policies! As a warm-up, we
begin with a simple micro-policy for dynamic sealing [23], a
linguistic mechanism analogous to perfect symmetric encryp-
tion. Informally, we extend the basic machine with three new
primitives (presented as monitor services): mkkey creates a
fresh sealing key; seal takes a data value (a machine word)
and a key and returns an opaque “sealed value” that can be
stored in memory and registers but not used in any other way
until it is passed (together with the same key that was used
to seal it) through the unseal service, which unwraps it and
returns the original raw word.
We proceed in three steps. First, we define an abstract
sealing machine, a straightforward extension of the basic ma-
chine from §2 that directly captures the “user’s view.” Second,
we show how the abstract machine can be emulated on the
symbolic machine by providing an appropriate encoding of
abstract-machine values (words, sealed values, and keys) as
symbolic atoms, together with a transfer function (written as a
program in Gallina) and Gallina implementations of the three
monitor services. We prove that the symbolic sealing machine
refines the abstract one. Third, we build concrete machine-code
realizations of the symbolic transfer function and the three
monitor services, which can be executed (together with user
code) on a concrete processor with PUMP hardware extensions.
We carry out the first two parts in this section and sketch the
third in §9.
Abstract Sealing Machine To define an abstract machine
with built-in sealing, we replace the raw words in the registers
and memory of the basic machine with values v drawn from the
more structured set Val ::= w | k | {w}k, where w ranges over
machine words, k ranges over an infinite set AK of abstract
sealing keys, and {w}k is the sealing of payload w under key
k. To keep the example simple, we disallow nested sealing and
sealing of keys: only words can be sealed. We enrich basic
machine states with a set ks of previously allocated keys, and
we assume there is some total function mkkey f that, given a
set of keys ks, chooses a fresh key not in the set.
The rules of the basic step relation are modified to use this
richer set of values. Most instructions will only work with raw
words—e.g., attempting to compare sealed values or jump to
a key will halt the machine. Load and Store require a word as
their first argument (the target memory address) but they place
no restrictions on the value being loaded or stored; similarly
Mov copies arbitrary values between registers.
mem[pc] = i decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp]=wp reg[rs]=vs mem′=mem[wp←vs]
(mem, reg, pc)→ (mem′, reg, pc+1) (STORE)
The operations of generating keys, sealing, and unsealing
are provided by monitor service routines located at addresses
mkkey addr, seal addr, and unseal addr, all of which lie
outside of accessible memory at the symbolic and abstract
levels (at the concrete level, the code for the services will
begin at these addresses). By convention, these routines take any
arguments in general-purpose registers rarg1 and rarg2 and return
their result in a general-purpose register rret. The definition of
the step relation includes a rule for each service that applies
when the pc is at the corresponding address. For example:
mkkey f ks=k reg′=reg[rret←k] reg[ra]=pc′
(mem, reg,mkkey addr, ks)→ (mem, reg′, pc′, k::ks)
(MKKEY)
This rule applies when the machine’s pc is mkkey addr. The
first premise uses mkkey f to generate a fresh key k. The
second premise updates the result register rret with k. The
third premise restores the pc from the register ra. To invoke
this service, a user program performs a Jal to the address
mkkey addr, which sets ra appropriately and causes this rule
to fire on the next step. Invoking services this way means that
we can run exactly the same user code on this abstract machine
as we do on the symbolic machine (described below) and the
concrete machine (§8-§9). The rule for the unsealing service is
similar (as is the one for the sealing service, which we omit):
reg[rarg1] = {w}k reg[rarg2] = k
reg′ = reg[rret←w] reg[ra] = pc′
(mem, reg, unseal addr, ks)→ (mem, reg′, pc′, ks) (UNSEAL)
The first two premises extract the sealed value {w}k from the
first argument register and check that second argument register
contains the same key k. (If the first register doesn’t contain
a sealed value or the key doesn’t match the second register,
the rule fails to fire and the machine gets stuck.) The third
premise writes the raw value w into the result register, and the
last premise extracts the return address from ra.
Symbolic Sealing Machine The abstract machine described
above constitutes a specification—an application programmer’s
view—of the sealing micro-policy. The next piece of the micro-
policy definition is a symbolic micro-policy that implements
this abstract specification in terms of tags. Since the pc is just
a bare word in the sealing abstract machine, and there are
no restrictions on when monitor services can be called, we
can take the pc and service tag sets Tpc and Ts to be just the
singleton set {•}. Tr and Tm, on the other hand, will be used
to represent the values of the abstract machine: their elements
have the one of the forms Data, Key k, or Sealed k, where k
is a symbolic key drawn from an ordered finite set SK. Raw
words are tagged Data. Keys are represented as a dummy
payload word (say, 0) tagged Key k for some k. A word w
tagged Sealed k represents the sealing of w under key k. The
extra state type EX is just SK—i.e., the extra state is a single
monotonic counter storing the next key to be generated. The
initial extra state is the minimum key.
Outside of monitor services, all the propagation and checking
of tags is performed by the transfer function of the symbolic
machine. In our formal development, transfer functions are
written in Gallina, but for readability here we will present
examples as collections of symbolic rules of the form
opcode : (PC ,CI ,OP1 ,OP2 ,OP3 )→ (PC ′,R′)
where the metavariables PC , CI , etc. range over symbolic
expressions, including variables plus a dummy value “−” to
indicate input or output fields that are ignored. For example,
the fact that Store requires an unsealed word in its pointer
register (OP1) and copies the tag of the source register (OP2)
to the result is captured by the following symbolic rule:
Store : (•,Data,Data, tsrc ,−)→ (•, tsrc)
Similarly, the Jal rule ensures that the target register (OP1) is
tagged Data:
Jal : (•,Data,Data,−,−)→ (•,Data)
(The symbolic machine step rule for Jal is in §B.)
As we described in §3, the symbolic machine handles all
monitor services with a single rule that uses a function get ser-
vice (provided as part of the micro-policy definition) to do the
actual work; given a memory address, get service returns either
nothing or a pair of a Gallina function defining the service’s
behavior and a symbolic tag that is passed to the transfer func-
tion so that it can check whether the call to this service is legal
from this machine state. For the sealing micro-policy, we define
get service to map mkkey addr to (mkkey, •), seal addr to
(seal, •), and unseal addr to (unseal, •), where mkkey and
unseal (seal is similar) are defined by:
reg[ra] = wpc′@ reg′ = reg[rret←0@(Key nk)]
nk 6= max key nk′ = nk + 1
mkkey (mem, reg, pc, nk) 7→ (mem, reg′, wpc′@•, nk′)
reg[rarg1] = w@(Sealed k) reg[rarg2] = w′@(Key k)
reg[ra] = wpc′@ reg′ = reg[rret←w@Data]
unseal (mem, reg, pc, nk) 7→ (mem, reg′, wpc′@•, nk)
The constant max key stands for the largest representable key,
and 0 is used as a dummy payload for fresh keys.
Note that mkkey is a partial function: it can fail if all keys
have been used up. This models the fact that, on the concrete
machine, keys will be implemented as fixed-width machine
words. By contrast, the abstract sealing machine uses an infinite
set of keys, so it will never fail for this reason. This discrepancy
is not an issue for the backward refinement property, which
only requires us to show that if the symbolic machine takes
a step then a corresponding step can be taken by the abstract
machine. (Forward refinement, on the other hand, does not hold:
the symbolic machine will fail to simulate the abstract one
when it runs out of fresh keys. Giving up forward refinement is
the price we pay for choosing not to expose low-level resource
constraints at the abstract level.)
Refinement We formalize the connection between the ab-
stract and symbolic sealing machines as a backward (i.e., from
symbolic to abstract) refinement property on traces. We state
the property here in a general form so that we can instantiate
it repeatedly throughout the paper.
Definition 4.1 (Backward refinement). We say that a low-level
machine (StateL,→L) backward refines a high-level machine
(StateH ,→H) with respect to a simulation relation ∼ between
low- and high-level states if, whenever sL1 ∼ sH1 and sL1 →∗ sL2 ,
there is some sH2 such that s
H
1 →∗ sH2 and sL2 ∼ sH2 .
Following standard practice, we prove this general multi-step
refinement property by establishing a correspondence between
individual execution steps. In the case of sealing, we prove a
strong 1-backward simulation theorem showing that each step
of the symbolic machine is simulated by exactly one step of
the abstract one.
Definition 4.2 (1-backward simulation). If sL1 ∼ sH1 and sL1 →
sL2 then there exists s
H
2 such that s
H
1 → sH2 and sL2 ∼ sH2 .
For sealing, since keys are dynamically allocated, our sim-
ulation relation is parameterized by a partial map ψ relating
abstract and symbolic keys. We begin by defining an auxiliary
relation ∼SAψ showing how abstract atoms relate to symbolic
ones (SA stands for Symbolic-to-Abstract):
w@Data ∼SAψ w′ when w = w′
w@(Key kS) ∼SAψ kA when ψ[kA] = kS
w@(Sealed kS) ∼SAψ {w′}kA when w = w′ ∧ ψ[kA] = kS .
The relation ∼SAψ does not hold otherwise. Then, we define
the simulation relation on states, also noted ∼SAψ , by lifting the
previous relation “pointwise” to all atoms, and adding these
invariants: (a) all abstract keys in the domain of ψ are in the
set of currently allocated keys in the abstract state; (b) all
symbolic keys in the range of ψ are strictly smaller than the
current value of the monotonic counter; and (c) ψ is injective.
We then get the following result:
Theorem 4.3 (1-backward SA-simulation for sealing). The
symbolic machine instantiated with the sealing micro-policy
1-backward-simulates the sealing abstract machine with respect
to the simulation relation λsS sA. ∃ψ. sS ∼SAψ sA.
Notice that, in the above statement, the key map parameter ψ
is existentially quantified and not fixed, since it must be updated
on each call to mkkey to maintain the correspondence between
the newly generated keys, which are drawn from different sets
at the two levels. This setup allows us to elide irrelevant details
of key allocation from the abstract machine. This is only a
minor convenience for sealing, but the idiom becomes quite
important in other micro-policies for hiding complex objects
like memory allocators (§7) from the high-level specification.
5 Compartmentalization Micro-Policy
We next describe a micro-policy for enforcing isolation be-
tween program-defined “compartments,” dynamically demar-
cated memory regions that, by default, cannot jump or write
to each other. This model is based on Wahbe et al.’s work
on software fault isolation (SFI) [32], with a few differences
discussed below. To demonstrate isolation, we show that a
symbolic-machine instance refines an abstract machine that
enforces compartmentalization by construction.
Abstract Machine The abstract machine for this micro-policy
enforces compartmentalization directly by maintaining, along-
side the usual machine state, a set C of current compartments
that is consulted on each step to prevent one compartment
from improperly transferring execution to or writing to an-
other. Each abstract compartment in C is a triple (A, J, S)
containing (1) an address space A of addresses that belong
to the compartment, i.e., where its instructions and data are
stored; (2) a set of jump targets J , additional addresses that
it is allowed to jump to; and (3) a set of store targets S,
additional addresses that it is allowed to write to. Compartments
are not limited to contiguous regions of memory. Also, as
in Wahbe et al.’s model [32], reading from memory is not
constrained: code in one compartment is permitted to read from
addresses in any other. (Adding a set of “read targets” to each
abstract compartment would be a straightforward extension.)
The machine maintains a number of invariants, of which the
most important is that all compartments have disjoint address
spaces.
The abstract machine state includes a flag F ∈ {Jumped,
FallThrough} that records whether or not the previous instruc-
tion was a Jump or a Jal, together with the previously executing
compartment, prev = (Aprev, Jprev, Sprev). This information is
used to prevent illegal pc changes (on both jumps and ordinary
steps) and to allow monitor services to see which compartment
called them.
At the abstract level, all instructions behave as in the basic
machine (§2), with the addition of a compartmentalization
check. For example, here is the rule for Store:
mem[pc] = i decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp] = wp reg[rs] = ws mem′ = mem[wp←ws]
(A, J, S) ∈ C pc ∈ A wp ∈ A ∪ S
(A, J, S) = (Aprev, Jprev, Sprev) ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ pc ∈ Jprev)
(mem, reg, pc, C, F, (Aprev, Jprev, Sprev))
→ (mem′, reg, pc + 1, C,FallThrough, (A, J, S)) (STORE)
Most of the new features here are common to the step rules
for all the instructions: each rule checks that the current in-
struction is executing inside some compartment ((A, J, S) ∈ C
and pc ∈ A) and (using prev) that execution arrived at this
instruction either (a) from the same compartment, or (b) with
F = Jumped and the current pc in the previous compartment’s
set of jump targets (the final line of the precondition). In the
new machine state, we update the previous compartment to
be the compartment the pc currently lies in. And we set F
to FallThrough (the rules for Jump and Jal set it to Jumped).
Besides these generic conditions, the Store rule has an addi-
tional check that its write is either to the current compartment
or to one of its store targets (wp ∈ A ∪ S).
Deferring detection of illegal pc changes until one step after
they have occurred is the key trick that makes this tag-based
implementation at the symbolic level work; we will use a
similar approach for CFI in §6.
The compartmentalization abstract machine also provides
three monitor services. The core service is isolate, which
creates a new compartment. It takes as input the description of a
fresh compartment (A′, J ′, S′) and adds it to C, also removing
the addresses in A′ from the address space of the parent
compartment. Before allowing the operation, the service checks,
relative to the parent compartment (A, J, S), that A′ ⊆ A, that
J ′ ⊆ A ∪ J , and that S′ ⊆ A ∪ S. This ensures that the
new compartment is no more privileged than its parent. The
argument sets are passed to the service as pointers to in-memory
data structures representing sets of addresses.
The other two services modify the target sets of the cur-
rent compartment. If the current compartment is (A, J, S),
add jump target takes as input an address a ∈ A and modifies
the current compartment to (A, J ∪ {a}, S); add store target
does the same thing for store targets. Note that although isolate
removes the child’s address space from the parent, it leaves the
store and jump targets of the parent unchanged, and these can
overlap with the child’s address space. Thus, the parent can
preserve access to an address in its child’s memory by calling
add jump target or add store target with that address before
invoking isolate.
In the initial configuration of the abstract machine, all defined
addresses lie in one big compartment and each monitor service
address has its own unique compartment (i.e., these locations
are special and live outside of addressable memory). The main
compartment has the addresses of the monitor services in its
set of jump targets, allowing it to call them; the monitor service
compartments have all defined addresses in their set of jump
targets, allowing them to return to any address. Since, in order
to call a monitor service, its address must lie in the calling
compartment’s set of jump targets, a parent compartment can
choose to prevent a child it creates from calling specific services
by restricting the child’s jump table.
Before returning, each monitor service checks that the com-
partment it is returning to is the same as the one it was called
from. This detail is needed to prevent malicious use of monitor
services to change compartments: otherwise, calling a service
from the last address of a compartment would cause execution
to proceed from the first address of a subsequent compartment,
even if the original compartment was not allowed to jump
there.
As a sanity check on the abstract machine, we prove that
it satisfies a compartmentalization property based on the in-
formal presentation by Wahbe et al. [32]. We first prove that
the machine maintains invariants ensuring that each defined
memory location lies in exactly one compartment. We use this
to prove that, on every step, (a) if the machine isn’t stuck, then
the new pc is either in the initial pc’s compartment or in its
set of jump targets; and (b) if a memory location was changed,
then its address was either in the initial pc’s compartment or
in its set of store targets.
Symbolic Machine Our method for implementing this ab-
stract machine in terms of tags involves “dualizing” the rep-
resentation of compartments: rather than maintaining global
state recording which compartments exist and what memory
locations they are allowed to affect, we instead tag memory
locations to record which compartments are allowed to affect
them. Compartments are represented by unique ids, and the
extra state of the symbolic machine contains a monotonic
counter next for the next available compartment id.
For this policy, Tm contains triples 〈c, I,W 〉, where c is
the id of the compartment to which a tagged memory location
belongs, I is the set of incoming compartment ids identifying
which other compartments are allowed to jump to this location,
and W is the set of writer ids identifying which other com-
partments are allowed to write to this location. Tpc contains
pairs 〈F, c〉, where the flag F has the same role as on the
abstract machine and c is the id of the compartment from
which the previous instruction was executed. Since registers do
not play a role in this micro-policy, Tr contains just the dummy
value •. The extra state contains three tags, tI, tAJ, and tAS,
corresponding to the tags on the monitor services’ entry points
in the abstract machine. We cannot use the symbolic machine’s
monitor service tags, as those are immutable; the compartmen-
talization policy thus maintain its mutable monitor service tags
in the extra state. (This limitation is not fundamental, but does
not impact any other micro-policies.)
Here are a few of the symbolic rules (the rest are similar):
c = c′ ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)
Nop : (〈F, c〉, 〈c′, I,W 〉,−,−,−)→ (〈FallThrough, c′〉,−)
c = c′ ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)
Jump : (〈F, c〉, 〈c′, I,W 〉, •,−,−)→ (〈Jumped, c′〉,−)
c = c′ ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I) c′ = c′′ ∨ c′ ∈W ′
Store : (〈F, c〉, 〈c′, I,W 〉, •, •, 〈c′′, I ′,W ′〉)
→ (〈FallThrough, c′〉, 〈c′′, I ′,W ′〉)
The first side-condition on all the rules guarantees that all pc
changes are legal: c, taken from the pc tag, is the previously-
executing compartment; and c′, from the tag on the current
instruction, is the current compartment. An execution step
is allowed if it is in the same compartment (c = c′), or if
it follows a jump from a permitted incoming compartment
(F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I). Similarly, the extra side-condition for
Store checks that the write is to a location in the currently-
executing compartment (c′ = c′′) or to a location that accepts
the current compartment as a writer (c′ ∈W ′).
From the rules, we can see that this encoding breaks up
the jump targets of each compartment, scattering the jumping
compartment’s id into the destination component in the tag
on each individual jump target; the store target are similarly
scattered across the writers component. The state maintained
in the pc tag corresponds exactly to the extra state maintained
by the abstract machine (i.e., F and prev), except that we use
a compartment id rather than an abstract compartment.
The monitor services must also be rephrased in terms of tags.
The add jump target service simply modifies the tag on the
given address; if the previous tag was 〈c, I,W 〉 and the current
compartment is c′, then the new tag will be 〈c, I ∪ {c′},W 〉.
The add store target service is analogous. The isolate service
does four things: (1) It gets a fresh compartment id cnew (from
the counter, which it then increments). (2) It retags every
location in the new compartment’s address space, changing its
tag from 〈c, I,W 〉 into 〈cnew, I,W 〉. (3) It retags every location
in the new compartment’s set of jump targets, changing its
tag from 〈cJ , IJ ,WJ〉 into 〈cJ , IJ ∪ {cnew},WJ〉. (4) It retags
the new compartment’s set of store targets, changing each tag
from 〈cS , IS ,WS〉 into 〈cS , IS ,WS ∪ {cnew}〉.
Refinement To prove that the symbolic compartmentalization
machine is correct, we prove backward simulation with respect
to the abstract compartmentalization machine:
Theorem 5.1 (1-backward SA-simulation). The symbolic com-
partmentalization machine backward-simulates the abstract
compartmentalization machine.
The bulk of the work in this proof lies in showing that
when we pass from a global set of compartment information
to our “dualized” tag-based approach, that we indeed retain
the same information: we must prove that the compartment
IDs are assigned consistently and that the jump targets/store
targets correspond to the incoming/writers. In other words, our
symbolic tags must “refine” our abstract compartments. This
difficulty shows up for the monitor services in particular: since
the effects of the monitor services are specified in terms of the
abstract representation (e.g., add jump target must add a jump
target, but there is no such thing at the symbolic level), the proof
that the effects of the symbolic implementations on the tags do
in fact correspond to the more direct abstract implementations
is particularly complicated. For the single-instruction steps of
the symbolic machine, we are able to capture most of the tag-
based complexity in a single lemma proving that the standard
symbolic check (c = c′ ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ c ∈ I)), along with
well-formedness and refinement constraints, suffices to prove
that the standard abstract checks ((A, J, S) ∈ C, pc ∈ A, and
(A, J, S) = (Aprev, Jprev, Sprev) ∨ (F = Jumped ∧ pc ∈ Jprev))
hold for the corresponding compartment.
Related Work Fine-grained compartmentalization is usually
achieved by software fault isolation [33]. There are several
verified SFI systems, including ARMor [35], RockSalt [24], and
a portable one by Kroll et al. [18]. Our compartmentalization
model is based on Wahbe et al.’s original SFI work [32] but
differs from it in several ways. Most importantly, our monitor
is not based on binary rewriting, but instead uses the hardware/
software mechanism of the PUMP architecture. Our model
is also richer in that it provides a hierarchical compartment-
creation mechanism instead of a single trusted top-level pro-
gram that can spawn one level of untrusted plugins. While
Wahbe et al.’s model produces safe (intra-compartment) but
arbitrary effects on compartmentalization violations, we detect
such violations and halt the machine. One feature Wahbe et al.’s
model that we do not currently support is inter-compartment
RPCs; we instead require programs to manually predeclare
inter-compartment calls and returns.
6 Control-Flow Integrity Micro-Policy
We next outline a micro-policy enforcing fine-grained control-
flow integrity (CFI) [1] as well as providing basic non-writable
code (NWC) and non-executable data (NXD) protection. It
dynamically enforces that all indirect control flows (computed
jumps) adhere to a fixed control flow graph (CFG). (This CFG
might, for example, be obtained from a compiler.) This prevents
control-flow-hijacking attacks, in which an attacker exploits a
low-level vulnerability to gain full control of a target program.
A more detailed description of this micropolicy is in §A.
Our main result is a proof that a variant of the CFI property
of Abadi et al. [1] holds for the symbolic machine when
instantiated with our CFI micro-policy. For this, we first prove
that the CFI property is preserved by backward simulation.
We then use this preservation result to show that the symbolic
CFI machine has CFI, by proving that it simulates an abstract
machine that has CFI by construction. The CFI definition relies
on a formal overapproximation of the attacker’s capabilities,
allowing the attacker to change any data in the system except
for the code, the pc, and the tags (if the machine has them).
This models an attacker that can mount buffer-overflow attacks
but cannot subvert the monitor; this is a reasonable assumption
since we assume that any implementation of the monitor will
be able to protect its integrity. For the same reason we assume
that in monitor mode all control flows are allowed. Since
we assume that monitor code is correct, we do not need to
dynamically enforce CFI there.
Abstract CFI Machine The abstract machine has separate
instruction and data memories; the instruction memory is fixed
(NWC), and instructions are fetched only from this memory
(NXD). Indirect jumps are checked against an allowed set J of
source-target pairs; if the control flow is invalid the machine
stops. The attacker can make arbitrary changes to the data
memory and registers at any time.
Symbolic CFI Machine At the symbolic level, code and data
are stored in the same memory, and we use tags to distinguish
between the two. Tags on memory are drawn from the set
Data | Code addr | Code ⊥ and for the pc from Code addr |
Code ⊥ (other registers are always tagged •). For the CFG
conformance checks, instructions that are the source or target
of indirect control flows are tagged with Code addr, where
addr is the address of the instruction in memory. For example,
a Jump instruction stored at address 500 is tagged Code 500.
The CFI policy does not need to keep track of where other
instructions are located, so they are all tagged Code ⊥. (This
keeps the number of distinct tags small, which would reduce
cache pressure when executing this micro-policy on the concrete
machine described in §8.) Only memory locations tagged Data
can be modified (NWC), and only instructions fetched from
locations tagged Code can be executed (NXD). The symbolic
rule for Store illustrates both these points:
Store : (Code ⊥,Code ,−,−,Data)→ (Code ⊥,Data)
It requires the fetched Store instruction to be tagged Code and
the written location to be tagged Data. On the other hand, the
Jal instruction’s rule requires that the current instruction be
tagged Code src; it then copies Code src to the pc tag:
Jal : (Code ⊥,Code src,−,−,−)→ (Code src,−)
Only on the next instruction do we get enough information
from the tags to check that the destination of the jump is
indeed allowed by J . For this we add a second rule for each
instruction, dealing with the case where it is the target of a
jump and thus the pc tag is Code src, e.g.:
(src, dst) ∈ J
Store : (Code src,Code dst,−,−,Data)→ (Code ⊥,Data)
We add such rules even for jump instructions, since the target
of a computed jump can itself be another computed jump:
(src, dst-src) ∈ J
Jal : (Code src,Code dst-src,−,−,−)→ (Code dst-src,−)
Proof Organization Our proofs are structured around a ge-
neric CFI preservation result that states that CFI is preserved
by backward simulation under some additional assumptions
(§A). As mentioned, we use this to transport the CFI property
from the abstract machine to the symbolic machine.
This approach allows us to structure our proofs in a modular
way. More importantly, the reusable nature of the preservation
theorem provides an easy way to transfer the CFI property
from the symbolic machine to a concrete machine that correctly
implements the CFI micro-policy while keeping most of the
reasoning about the properties of the micro-policy at a higher
level. We were able to do this and transport the CFI property
to the instance of the concrete machine presented in §8; details
are presented in §A.
Finally, we prove that the symbolic machine backward-
simulates the correct-by-construction abstract machine, which—
in combination with our CFI preservation result—proves the
correctness of the micro-policy.
Related Work Abadi et al. [1] proposed both the first CFI
definition and a reasonably efficient, though coarse-grained,
enforcement mechanism based on binary analysis and rewriting,
in which each node in the CFG is assigned to one of three
equivalence classes. This seminal work was extended in various
directions, often trading off precision for low overheads and
practicality [34]. However, recent attacks against coarse-grained
CFI [10], [14] have illustrated the security risks of imprecision.
This has spurred interest in fine-grained CFI [8], [22], [28],
sometimes called complete or ideal CFI; however, this has been
deemed “very expensive” [14]. Several proposed hardware
mechanisms are directly targeted at speeding up CFI [5], [9];
here we achieve CFI using a generic hardware mechanism
in a formally verified way. The PUMP mechanism supports
fine-grained CFI with modest runtime overhead [11]. Previous
formal verification efforts for CFI include ARMor [35] and
KCoFI [8]. Like most work on CFI, they use inline reference
monitoring [13]; their verification targets a small-TCB compo-
nent which validates that the right checks were inserted in the
instrumented binary.
7 Memory Safety Micro-Policy
Last, we describe a micro-policy that enforces safe access to
heap-allocated data, by preventing both spatial safety violations
(e.g., accessing an array out of its bounds) and temporal
safety violations (e.g., referencing through a pointer after the
region has been freed). Such violations are a common source
of serious security vulnerabilities such as heap-based buffer
overflows, confidential data leaks, and exploitable use-after-
free, and double-free bugs. The policy we study here only
guards heap-allocated data, for which calls to the malloc and
free monitor services tell us how to set up and tear down
memory regions; we leave stack allocation and C-like unboxed
structs as future work.
Abstract Machine The abstract machine presents a block-
based memory model to the programmer [4], [20]: it operates
on values that are either ordinary machine words w or pointers
p. A pointer is a pair (b, o) of a block identifier b (drawn from
an infinite set) and an offset o (a machine word). The memory
is a partial function from block identifiers to lists of values; its
domain is the set of allocated blocks. Load and Store require
pointer values (b, o). They first look up the block id b in the
memory; if this block is currently allocated, they obtain a list
of values vs, which they read or update at index o (provided o
is in bounds).
mem[bpc] = vspc vspc[opc] = i decode i=Store rp rs
reg[rp]=(b, o) reg[rs]=v
mem[b]=vs vs′=vs[o←v] mem′=mem[b←vs′]
(mem, reg, (bpc, opc))→ (mem′, reg, (bpc, opc+1)) (STORE)
The pc itself contains a pointer with a block and an offset;
instruction fetching works the same as normal memory loads.
As with sealing key generation (§4), the allocation and
freeing monitor services are parameterized by two functions,
alloc f and free f, that are assumed to satisfy certain high-
level properties: alloc f takes a memory and a size, and returns
a block that was not already allocated and a new memory in
which this block is mapped to a frame; free f takes a memory
and an allocated block and returns a new memory where the
block is no longer allocated, keeping all other blocks the same.
Symbolic Machine In the symbolic part of the memory-
safety micro-policy, we replace the block-structured memory
of the abstract machine by a flat memory where each cell is
tagged with a color representing the block to which it belongs.
Pointers are also tagged with colors, and when a pointer is
dereferenced we check that its color matches the color of the
memory cell it points to.
More precisely, we use different sets of tags for values
in registers (and the pc) and in memory. Value tags tv are
either pointers tagged with a color c or non-pointers tagged
⊥. Allocated memory locations are tagged with a pair (c, tv),
where c is the color of the encompassing block and tv is the
tag of the stored value. Unallocated memory is tagged with
the special tag F (free). We use tm to range over memory tags.
The extra state for this policy is a list of block descriptors
recording which memory regions have been allocated (with the
corresponding base and bounds) and which colors correspond
to them, plus a counter for generating new colors.
The malloc monitor service first searches the list of block
descriptors for a free block of at least the required size, cuts
off the excess if needed, generates a fresh color c, initializes
the new memory block with 0@(c,⊥), and returns the atom
w@c, where w is the start address of the block.
The free monitor service reads the pointer color, deallocates
the corresponding block, tags its cells with F, and updates the
block descriptors. The F tags prevent any remaining pointers
to the deallocated block from being used to access it after
deallocation. If a later allocation reuses the same memory, it
will be tagged with a different (larger) color, so these dangling
pointers will still be unusable.
The symbolic rules for Load and Store check that the pointer
and the referenced location have the same color c.
Load : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), c, (c, tv),−)→ (cpc, tv)
Store : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), c, tv, (c, t′v))→ (cpc, (c, tv))
We additionally require that the pc tag cpc matches the color
of the block to which the pc points. This ensures that the pc
cannot be used to leak information about inaccessible frames
by loading instructions from them. On Jumps we change the
color of the pc to the color c of the pointer, while for Jal we
also use cpc to tag the ra register:
Jump : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), c,−,−)→ (c,−)
Jal : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), tv,−,−)→ (tv, cpc).
We also allow Jals to words tagged ⊥, since monitor services
lie outside the accessible memory at this level of abstraction
and so cannot be referenced by normal pointers.
Binary operations are allowed between values tagged ⊥
(non-pointers), and they produce values tagged ⊥:
Binop⊕ : (cpc, (cpc,⊥),⊥,⊥,−)→ (cpc,⊥)
We also allow adding and subtracting integers from pointers:
Binop+,− : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), c,⊥,−)→ (cpc, c)
Binop+ : (cpc, (cpc,⊥),⊥, c,−)→ (cpc, c)
The result of such pointer arithmetic is a pointer with the
same color c. The new pointer is not necessarily in bounds,
but the rules for Load and Store will prevent invalid accesses.
(Computing an out-of-bounds pointer is not a violation per
se—indeed, it happens quite often in practice, e.g., at the end
of loops.) Moreover, subtraction can compute the integer offset
between two pointers to the same block:
Binop−,= : (cpc, (cpc,⊥), c, c,−)→ (cpc,⊥)
Pointers to the same block can also be compared for equality
using Binop=. But comparing a pointer and a non-pointer or
comparing two pointers to different blocks must be disallowed
(because two out-of-bounds pointers to different blocks can be
numerically equal at the symbolic level, whereas they cannot
be equal at the abstract level). While the transfer function can
detect this situation, it cannot alter the results of instructions;
thus, we can only preserve refinement by having the transfer
function stop execution. Intuitively, all instructions on pointers
must be expressible at the abstract level independent of base
addresses. (Subtraction works as presented because equal base
addresses cancel out, even in the presence of overflows.)
Monitor services do not have this restriction, though, so we
can—if one is required—provide a total equality service that
returns false in those cases where the equality instruction would
be disallowed.
Refinement We prove a backward-simulation theorem similar
to the one for sealing (§4):
Theorem 7.1 (1-backward SA-simulation). The symbolic mem-
ory safety machine backward-simulates the abstract machine.
The main technical difficulty lies in formalizing the correspon-
dence between memory addresses at the symbolic and abstract
levels, and showing that this correspondence is preserved
throughout execution. Specifically, each color c used at the
symbolic machine should map to a block identifier b at the
abstract level, in such a way that the memory region tagged
with c matches the block pointed to by b; we consider that an
address x marked with color c should correspond to memory
location (b, x− xbase) at the abstract level, where xbase is the
base address of the corresponding region. Additionally, we
must maintain the invariant that symbolic block descriptors
faithfully describe how memory regions are tagged.
Showing that memory operations and monitor services (in
particular, the allocator) preserve the refinement relation in-
volves explicitly manipulating the address mappings described
above and a fair amount of low-level reasoning about address
segments and arithmetic, which consumes almost half of the
complete proof.
Related Work Our scheme is inspired by the metadata taint-
ing technique of Clause et al. [7]. Similar ideas have been
used by Watchdog [25] (for temporal safety), though these
systems do not have formal proofs. Nagarakatte et al. have
verified in Coq that the SoftBound pass in LLVM/Vellvm
satisfies “spatial safety” [27] and that the CETS temporal safety
extension to SoftBound is correct in the sense of backward
simulation[26]. These proofs are with respect to correct-by-
construction special-purpose machines. Abadi and Plotkin [2]
show that address space layout randomization can be used to
prevent low-level attacks, including memory safety violations,
by proving a probabilistic variant of full abstraction with respect
to a high-level language semantics.
8 Concrete Machine
Having explored four examples of how the symbolic machine
can be instantiated to enforce a variety of micro-policies, we
turn to the question of how its behavior can be realized on a
concrete machine that incorporates PUMP-like hardware [11] in
idealized form. The concrete machine differs from the symbolic
one in several key ways. (1) Its memory, registers, and pc hold
concrete atoms of the form w@t, where the concrete tag t is
simply a machine word (possibly interpreted as a pointer into
memory). (2) It propagates and checks tags using a cache of
concrete rules, each encoding a single tuple from the graph
of the (concrete) transfer function. (3) The cache initially
contains a finite set of ground rules; it is further populated
as needed by a software miss handler, which embodies the
transfer function. (4) Extra machine state is represented by
ordinary in-memory data structures. (5) Each monitor service
is implemented as an (almost) ordinary software subroutine,
whose starting address coincides with the service’s entry point
at the abstract and symbolic levels. An instance of the symbolic
machine for a specific micro-policy is realized on the concrete
machine by defining a concrete encoding for tags and any extra
state, providing a miss handler that implements the symbolic
transfer function, and providing implementations of any monitor
services. In §9, we describe a generic approach to constructing
and verifying such realizations. In the remainder of this section,
we formalize the concrete machine itself as an extension of the
basic machine (§2). A practical PUMP implementation [11]
would add similar extensions to a real-world RISC ISA. The
details in this section are not needed to follow §9 and can be
skimmed if desired.
The concrete machine adds four new instructions for monitor
code:
AddRule | JumpFpc | GetTag rs rd | PutTag rs rtag rd
AddRule, described in detail below, inserts a new rule into the
cache. JumpFpc is used to return from the miss handler: it
jumps to the address in the fpc (“fault pc”), a new special-
purpose register that holds the address of the faulting instruction
after a cache miss. GetTag r1 r2 takes the tag t from the atom
w@t stored in r1 and returns it as the payload part of a new
atom t@Monitor in r2, where Monitor is a fixed concrete tag
used by monitor code. PutTag r1 r2 r3 does the converse: if
r1 and r2 contain w1@t1 and w2@t2, it stores w1@w2 into r3.
The monitor self-protection mechanism described in §9 ensures
that these instructions can only be executed by monitor code.
Concrete states have the form (mem, reg, pc, fpc, cache), where
cache is a set of concrete rules, each of the form (iv, ov).
The input vector iv represents the key for rule cache lookups
and contains the instruction opcode, the tag of the current
instruction, the tag of the pc, and up to three operand tags. The
output vector ov provides the tags of the new pc and of the
result. On each step, the machine constructs iv from the current
instruction opcode and the relevant tags and looks it up in the
cache. If a matching rule is found (written cache ` iv 7→ ov),
the instruction is allowed and the next state is tagged according
to ov. If no rule matches (cache ` iv ↑), then iv is saved in
memory, the current pc value is saved in the fpc, and control is
transferred to a fixed address where the miss handler should be
loaded (trapaddr). Accordingly, each rule in the step relation
comes in two variants—one for when we hit in the cache and
one for when we trap to the miss handler. For example, here
are the rules for Store:
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp]=wp@tp reg[rs]=ws@ts mem[wp]= @td
cache ` (Store, tpc, ti, tp, ts, td) 7→ (t′pc, t′d)
mem′ = mem[wp←ws@t′d]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, fpc, cache)
→ (mem′, reg, (wpc+1)@t′pc, fpc, cache)
(STORE)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Store rp rs
reg[rp]=wp@tp reg[rs]=ws@ts mem[wp]= @td
cache ` (Store, tpc, ti, tp, ts, td) ↑
mem′ = mem[0..5← (Store, tpc, ti, tp, ts, td)]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, fpc, cache)
→ (mem′, reg, trapaddr@Monitor, wpc@tpc, cache)
(STORE-MISS)
Addresses 0 to 5 are used, by convention, to store the current iv
for use by the miss handler in the final premise of the second
rule. The miss handler computes the result tags, stores them at
addresses 6 and 7, and uses the AddRule instruction to insert
the new rule into the cache.
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = AddRule
cache ` (AddRule, tpc, ti,−,−,−) 7→ (t′pc,−)
mem[0..7] = (opcode, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7)
cache′ = cache unionmulti ((opcode, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) 7→ (t6, t7))
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, fpc, cache)
→ (mem, reg′, (wpc+1)@t′pc, fpc, cache′)
(ADDRULE)
Here unionmulti is map update, overwriting any previous value for
(opcode, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5). For simplicity, we assume that the
cache’s size is unlimited, avoiding the need to model eviction;
limiting the cache size would require more complicated code
for handling cache misses, of course, but would not change
the specification of handler correctness (see §9).
A final detail is that the machine can be configured on a per-
opcode basis to mask out (i.e., set to a predefined “don’t care”
tag) selected fields of the iv before matching against the cache.
This is easy to implement in hardware, and it permits a single
cache entry to match many different iv tuples. The machine
can also be configured on a per-opcode basis to “copy through”
a specified iv tag to either of the ov tag fields. These features
allow more compact representation of transfer functions as
concrete rules. The machine uses a special pair of don’t-care
and copy-through masks when running monitor code (i.e., when
the pc tag is Monitor); we use this to ensure that the set of
ground rules is finite (see §9) and that the monitor does not
fault when it comes in contact with user tags (for instance
when returning back to user mode).
9 Concrete Micro-Policy Monitor
The last piece of our story is the realization of symbolic micro-
policies on the concrete machine. Although symbolic micro-
policies vary widely in details, concrete micro-policy imple-
mentations share several important characteristics: (1) concrete
tags (and extra state) must faithfully encode symbolic tags
(and extra state); (2) the concrete miss handler and monitor
services code must implement the symbolic machine’s Coq
specifications; (3) control transfers between user and monitor
code must obey a clear protocol; and (4) tags and monitor code
and data must be protected from malicious or compromised user
code. To take advantage of these commonalities, we have built
a generic framework for organizing the construction of concrete
micro-policies and proved a theorem stating that they refine
a corresponding symbolic machine instance. Since symbolic
micro-policies can be specified using the full power of Gallina,
the details of concrete tag and extra state representation plus
the actual code for the miss handler and monitor services must
all be provided by the micro-policy designer. This code might
be handwritten or generated from a high-level language by a
compiler; the details are unimportant. The proof of correctness
of the generic framework is parameterized on correctness proofs
for these policy-specific components.2
Tag Representation A micro-policy has four sets of sym-
bolic tags (Tm, Tr, Tpc and Ts) that must be represented as
word-sized bit vectors on the concrete machine. Concrete tags
on the register file and the pc will be used to represent symbolic
ones drawn from the corresponding sets—namely, Tr and Tpc.
Since monitor services are implemented by code that lives in
memory, a tag in memory will either represent something in
Tm (in which case it marks a memory location that is visible
at the symbolic level), or something in Ts (in which case it
marks the address of a monitor service).
Formally, this representation scheme is specified by par-
tial decoding functions deck(memC , tC) that take a concrete
machine memory and concrete machine tag word as inputs,
and produce symbolic tags as output.3 Here, k ∈ {M,R,P}
specifies which kind of concrete tag—memory, register or pc—
we are decoding, so that we know what kind of symbolic
tag to produce. Hence, decM(memC , tC) ∈ {User tS | tS ∈
Tm}unionmulti {Entry tS | tS ∈ Ts}, while decR(memC , tC) ∈ Tr and
decP(memC , tC) ∈ Tpc. We say that a concrete tag is a valid
user-level tag (given some memory) when it can be decoded
into a symbolic tag. For simplicity, from here on we will refer
to such tags by their symbolic decodings. We require that
deck(memC ,Monitor) be undefined—i.e., that no symbolic tag
be represented by it.
Monitor Self-Protection At the symbolic level, it is impos-
sible for user code to interfere with the internal state of the
2To manage the size of our verification effort and focus attention on the
more novel parts, we assume the existence of correct monitor implementations
as hypotheses. We expect the actual implementations to be straightforward,
and verification of this kind of low-level code is a well-studied area [4], [6],
[17].
3For simple micro-policies, symbolic tags can be accurately represented
in a single machine word, so dec does not depend on the memory argument.
More complex micro-policies may use the memory argument to represent tags
as data structures in memory—e.g., the compartmentalization micro-policy
of §5 uses this feature.
micro-policy. At the concrete level, however (unlike in some of
our own previous work [4], [11]), monitor code and data live in
ordinary memory and registers, which user code must somehow
be prevented from accessing. Moreover, we need to ensure
that only monitor code can execute the special instructions
AddRule, PutTag, GetTag, and JumpFpc. Fortunately, we can
use the PUMP itself both to implement the symbolic micro-
policy and, at the same time, to enforce the restrictions above
(which we call monitor self-protection). To achieve this, we
use the special Monitor tag to mark all of the monitor’s code
and data, allowing the miss handler to detect when untrusted
code is trying to tamper with it, as explained below.
Monitor Code and Ground Rules On the concrete machine,
every instruction causes a rule cache lookup, which results in a
fault if no corresponding rule is present. Since the machine has
no special “privileged mode,” this applies even to monitor code.
To ensure that monitor code can do its job, we set up cache
ground rules (one for each opcode) saying that the machine can
step whenever the PC and CI tags in the iv are tagged Monitor;
in this case, the next pc and any result of the instruction are also
tagged Monitor. Monitor code must never change or override
these rules.
In addition, the fact that the machine uses a special pair of
don’t-care and copy-through masks when running monitor code
lets us ensure that the monitor does not fault when coming in
contact with user tags. For example, while policies will usually
check the tag on the target pc every time user code performs
a Jump (which may cause faults), such checks are not needed
for monitor code, since we assume that it behaves correctly.
To allow for both behaviors, we program the monitor-specific
masks to always use the tag of a Jump target as the new pc tag,
while disabling this bypass in the normal masks. Aside from
the PC and CI tags, all other positions in the iv are marked as
don’t-care for all opcodes. Copy-throughs are used for keeping
the same pc tag in most instructions and for copying the pc
tag from a register tag in the case of Jump, Jal, and JumpFpc.
Mov, Load, Store, and Jal also use copy-through for the result
tag.
Miss Handler Since ground rules ensure that monitor code
never faults, the miss handler is only invoked for monitoring
user-level code. The job of the miss handler is thus twofold:
(i) implement the symbolic transfer function of a micro-policy;
and (ii) enforce monitor self-protection. For the latter, the
miss handler just needs to ensure that the faulting opcode
is not a privileged instruction (e.g., AddRule), and that the
Monitor tag does not occur anywhere in the faulting iv (which,
crucially, includes the tags on the “old contents” of any registers
and memory locations that the instruction overwrites). If these
checks fail, the miss handler halts the machine. (In a real system,
the miss handler would instead tell the scheduler to halt just the
offending process.) Otherwise, the miss handler can compute
the transfer function on the iv, halting the machine if it violates
the micro-policy. If the instruction is allowed, the miss handler
should store the resulting ov into the appropriate memory slots,
call AddRule to install it, and restart the instruction that trapped
by jumping through the fpc register.
Besides correctly implementing its symbolic counterpart, the
concrete transfer function is also responsible for setting the
next pc to Monitor whenever a valid monitor-service call is
made (i.e., when the instruction tag is Entry tS). This ensures
that monitor services can execute with the appropriate privilege.
Refinement We formalize the relation between the symbolic
machine (instantiated with the symbolic parts of some micro-
policy) and the concrete machine (instantiated with the concrete
parts of the same micro-policy) as a backward refinement
between their step relations.4 The proof of backward refinement
relies on some lemmas relating the symbolic and concrete parts
of the specific policy; the proofs of these must also be supplied
by the micro-policy designer.
At the heart of our refinement result lies the following strong
simulation relation, which describes how a symbolic machine
state is represented at the concrete level.
Definition 9.1. Strong simulation ≈CS is defined as follows (its
pieces are discussed below):
regC ∼memC regS memC ∼ memS
cache ok(memC , cache) services ok(memC)
memC [0..7] = [ @Monitor, . . . , @Monitor]
I(memC , regC , cache, extra) decP(memC , tC) = tS
(memC , regC , pc@tC , fpc, cache)
≈CS (memS , regS , pc@tS , extra)
This relation is implicitly parameterized over policy-specific
decoding functions (decP , etc.) plus an invariant I , which
should be chosen to ensure that (i) the symbolic machine’s
extra state component is correctly represented in the concrete
machine memory; (ii) the monitor’s code and data are tagged
appropriately; and (iii) the cache contains the ground rules
needed by the monitor. A concrete register file simulates a
symbolic one (regC ∼memC regS) when they agree on register
values and the tags decode to the corresponding symbolic tags:
∀r, x, tS , (∃tC , regC [r] = x@tC ∧ decR(memC , tC) = tS)
⇐⇒ regS [r] = x@tS
The relation memC ∼ memS is defined similarly; notice that
the concrete machine can contain more registers or memory
locations than the symbolic machine, as long as the concrete
tags on these registers or locations do not encode any valid
user tag. The predicate cache ok states that, whenever a rule
with a valid user-level pc tag is found in the cache, the rule’s
result matches that of the symbolic transfer function, modulo
the tag encoding. The predicate services ok states that each
location in the concrete memory that corresponds to a monitor
service is tagged with Entry tS , where tS is that service’s tag.
4Our formal Coq development also gives sufficient conditions for proving
forward refinement between the implementation of some policy on the concrete
machine and the corresponding symbolic machine instance. Since this is not
the focus of the present work—and since, in any case, forward refinement
between the symbolic and abstract machines doesn’t hold for all policies—we
omit the details here, referring the reader to the formal development for more
information.
Once again, we would like to construct a backward re-
finement inductively by using a backward simulation (Def-
inition 4.2). However, we can’t use Definition 9.1 for this
right away, since backward refinement doesn’t hold for it
because steps taken by the concrete machine while inside the
monitor are not mapped to any steps of the symbolic machine.
Moreover, the concrete monitor will often need to temporarily
break both the invariants and the strong correspondence with
respect to some symbolic state. To address these points, we
use Definition 9.1 to define a weak simulation relation ∼CS:
Definition 9.2. sC ∼CS sS if either (i) the pc of sC has a
valid user-level tag and sC ≈CS sS , or else (ii) the pc of sC
is tagged Monitor and there exists a state sCU with a pc that
is a valid user-level tag such that sCU ≈CS sS and sCU →∗ sC ,
where all states in this execution have the pc tagged Monitor.
Case (ii) handles concrete states where the monitor is executing,
giving us a way to remember enough information from the
point where the monitor was invoked to be able to reestablish
strong simulation once execution returns to user mode.
Definition 9.3 ({0, 1}-backward simulation). We say that a
low-level machine (StateL,→L) {0, 1}-backward simulates a
high-level machine (StateH ,→H) with respect to a relation ∼
if, whenever sL1 ∼ sH1 and sL1 → sL2 , either sL2 ∼ sH1 or there
exists sH2 such that s
H
1 → sH2 and sL2 ∼ sH2 .
Theorem 9.4 (Backward CS-simulation). The concrete machine
{0, 1}-backward-simulates the symbolic machine, with respect
to ∼CS.
The proof assumes the correctness of the monitor machine code
provided by the micro-policy designer: (1) On a cache miss, if
all the invariants are satisfied at the faulting instruction, then
the miss handler must successfully return to a user state only if
the faulting tag combination is allowed by the transfer function.
In this case, the resulting user state must be a refinement of
the original symbolic state, and the cache must be updated
to allow execution to proceed. (2) When executing a monitor
service, the concrete machine returns to user code only if the
corresponding symbolic monitor service allows that execution.
In this case, the resulting user state must be a refinement of the
new symbolic state. (3) Monitor data structures and invariants
are not affected by updates to user memory.
Therefore, for any policy implemented in terms of abstract
and symbolic machines, we can get end-to-end refinement
by composing Theorem 9.4 and the policy-specific symbolic-
abstract simulation, relating the abstract machine to the concrete
machine instantiated with a correct monitor implementation.
Example: Concrete Sealing Machine To implement the
sealing micro-policy from §4 on the concrete machine, we
can represent symbolic sealing tags as follows on a concrete
machine with 32-bit words, assuming that |SK| ≤ 228 and the
Monitor tag is represented by 0.5
5Disclaimer: We have implemented and tested this concrete sealing micro-
policy as a sanity check on our framework, but we have not formally proved
the sealing-specific assumptions supporting Theorem 9.4.
f(028 · 0 · 0) = Data
f(k · 0 · 1) = Key k
f(k · 1 · 1) = Sealed k
decP(m, · 1) = •
decR(m, t · 0 · 1) = f(t)
decM(m, t · 0 · 1) = User f(t)
decM(m, · 1 · 0) = Entry •
Here · is bitstring concatenation and k is a 28-bit binary
representation of a symbolic key. (Notice that our sealing tags
can be represented in a single word, so dec does not depend
on the machine memory.) The key counter on the symbolic
machine is represented concretely as a single word of monitor
memory. Implementing the transfer function is easy: we just
need to prevent certain operations (e.g., Binop) from being
performed on sealed values and keys, following the symbolic
rules presented in §4. Implementing the monitor services is also
simple. The mkkey routine increments the key counter (halting
if it would overflow) and remembers the old value k. It then
tags the return register with Key k (with a dummy payload) and
returns to user code. The seal routine checks (using GetTag)
that its first argument has the form x@Data and its second
argument is tagged Key k, assembles x@Sealed k in rret using
PutTag, and returns; unseal does the converse. All of these
routines halt if the arguments do not have the required form.
10 Related Work
We have already discussed work related to specific micro-
policies. Here we focus on work related to micro-policies and
reference monitors in general.
Micro-Policies The micro-policies framework and the PUMP
architecture have their roots in SAFE, a clean-slate, security-
oriented architecture [12]. There, the PUMP was used only
to implement dynamic IFC; other special-purpose hardware
mechanisms enforced properties such as memory safety [19]
and compartmentalization [12]. Still, the PUMP design in the
SAFE system was made quite flexible, since dynamic IFC is
an active area of research, with various mechanisms and “label
models” being proposed regularly, making baked-into-hardware
solutions unattractive. A simple IFC micro-policy was studied
formally for an idealized version of the SAFE processor [4].
The present work aims to demonstrate the applicability of
the PUMP beyond IFC and beyond clean-slate hardware. We
consider a diverse set of micro-policies and a more conventional
architecture—a simplified RISC machine, with bit-strings as
words (instead of integers), with registers (instead of a hardware
stack), and with no separate instruction memory, no call-
stack or memory protection, no special monitor mode with
access to protected memory, and no special monitor invocation
instruction. Despite giving up these multiple specialized hard-
ware protection features, we obtain similar kinds of protection
through more extensive use of the PUMP’s tagging features.
The general structure of our proofs is similar to [4]; in
particular, that work also proves refinement between a concrete
machine and an abstract one, using a “symbolic IFC rule
machine” as an intermediate step; also, as we do here for CFI, it
proves a generic preservation theorem that non-interference can
be carried to the lowest level. The rule machine in [4], however,
is merely a reformulation of an IFC abstract machine to factor
a “rule table” (written in a simple IFC-specific domain-specific
language) out of the semantics. In contrast, our symbolic
machine is generic and is reused by all micro-policies. On
the other hand, the proofs in [4] include the verification of
an IFC monitor at the machine code level using a framework
for structured code generators and a verified DSL compiler,
both specially crafted for the simple architecture used there.
Here, we chose to focus on designing a generic micro-policy
framework and on building and verifying the symbolic machine
instances for a diverse set of micro-policies, leaving concrete-
level implementation and verification for later.
Another paper on the PUMP [11] proposes implementation
optimizations for its hardware architecture and experimentally
evaluates their overhead for a set of micro-policies including
CFI and memory safety, plus a taint-tracking micro-policy. Our
work here is complementary, focusing on formal specification
and verification of micro-policies. Also, the micro-policies
for compartmentalization and dynamic sealing, as well as the
mechanisms for monitor services and monitor self-protection
described here, are new.
Reference Monitors Reference monitors have been around
since the early seventies [3]. However, building low-overhead
enforcement mechanisms for a broad set of policies has proved
challenging. Besides low overhead, Anderson’s seminal work
mentions a set of security requirements for reference monitors:
“(a) The reference monitor must fully mediate all operations
relevant to the enforced security policy. (b) The integrity of the
reference monitor must be protected, either by the reference
monitor itself or by some external means. (c) The correctness
of the reference monitor must be assured, in part by making
the reference monitor be small enough to analyze and test.”
Micro-policies meet all these requirements: (a) they provide
complete mediation at the level of individual instructions;
(b) they include mechanisms for using tags to protect the
integrity of monitor code and data structures (§9); and (c) the
TCB of micro-policy monitors is generally quite small. More-
over, we achieve high confidence in the their correctness by
formal verification of symbolic policies in Coq; in the future
we hope also to verify low-level concrete implementations.
Finally, while precisely characterizing the class of properties
that can be expressed as micro-policies and efficiently enforced
by the PUMP is an interesting open problem, we know for
sure that it includes very important security properties: IFC,
CFI, compartmentalization, and memory safety. Inspiration for
attacking the expressiveness question formally may come from
the work by Schneider et al. [15], [29] on execution monitors
and program rewriting.
11 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a generic verification framework for a rich
class of low-level, hardware-accelerated, tag-based security
enforcement mechanisms. The micro-policies we verify target
a wide range of critical security properties, illustrating the
power of a simple but flexible hardware mechanism.
Our Coq development runs to about 17.7k lines of code,
out of which 4.8k lines are generic (2.8k for the symbolic
machine and the generic symbolic-concrete refinement proof)
and the rest specific to our four micro-policies (4.9k for com-
partmentalization, 4.7k for CFI, 1.9k for memory safety, and
1.2k for dynamic sealing). Our Coq development is available
at https://github.com/micro-policies/micro-policies-coq.
We are currently working on a micro-policy for call-stack
protection, as well as extensions of the current policies, such
as memory protection for stack-allocated data and unboxed
structs. An obvious question at the level of the framework
itself is how to compose micro-policies. Certain micro-policies
are known to compose sensibly, and micro-architectural op-
timizations ensure that they perform well on practical work-
loads [11], but the general picture remains unclear. Another
obvious target for future work is formalizing the symbolic rule
language that we used informally here for exposition.
Our framework currently targets a simplified ISA with a
limited instruction set, a single core, no hardware concurrency
or interrupts, etc. An interesting challenge is to scale our
formalization to a more realistic RISC architecture such as
MIPS, Alpha, RISC-V, or ARM extended with a PUMP. Also,
we have not explicitly considered the role of the compiler
or loader here, although in reality their support is crucial for
some policies. For example, CFI relies on having a control-flow
graph, which would naturally come from a compiler, and on the
initial tags on instructions, which would have to be added or at
least vetted by the loader. We have not formalized the operating
system or its interaction with micro-policy monitoring. Indeed,
micro-policies might even live below an OS, and could then
help protect the OS itself from attacks. Another alternative
(discussed in [11]) is to only protect user-level code, but this
would lead to a larger TCB.
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Appendix
A Details of the CFI Micro-Policy
CFI Property and Attacker Model We give a generic CFI
definition that can be instantiated to all three levels of machine,
adapting the original definition by Abadi et al. [1] to our setting.
The two main technical differences are that (1) at the symbolic
level, the tag-based mechanism detects a CFI violation on the
step after it has occurred (i.e., when checking the instruction
following an illegal control transfer, rather than the instruction
that caused the transfer) and (2) at the concrete level, detecting
a violation and halting the machine is a nontrivial process
involving missing in the hardware rule cache and running the
software miss handler, which eventually halts. These differences
do not affect security (at both levels, the machine halts before
it does anything externally visible), but they lead to a slightly
more complex CFI definition.
As usual [1], the definition is given with respect to an
extended step relation→, which is the union of normal machine
steps →n and attacker steps →a.The →n and →a relations
are parameters of the general CFI definition. The →a relation
represents an overapproximation of the attacker’s capabilities,
allowing the attacker to change any user-level data in the system
but none of the code. At the concrete and symbolic levels, the
attacker will also be prevented from directly changing the tags.
This models an attacker that can mount buffer-overflow attacks
but has no built-in capability for subverting our NWC, NXD,
or CFI protections (e.g., no hardware backdoor).
We start by defining when a trace has CFI with respect to
a set of allowed indirect jumps J (a binary relation on code
addresses). From J we can construct the complete CFG, a
relation on machine states written cfg J . This involves adding
all direct CFG edges that are clear in the code (e.g., a Nop or
Bnz can reach the next instruction; a Bnz can reach its target).
Definition A.1. We say that an execution trace s0 → s1 →
. . . → sn has CFI if (si, si+1) ∈ cfg J for all i ∈ [0, . . . , n)
such that si →n si+1.
Compared to Abadi et al. [1], this definition additionally
requires that an attacker step which happens to be a valid
normal step must also be in the CFG, which is helpful for
proving CFI preservation. This definition is slightly stronger
than Abadi et al.’s; however, we instead use the following
incomparable definition, which allows a single violation in a
trace, as long as the machine is “stopping” afterwards.
Definition A.2 (CFI). We say that the machine (State, init,→n,
→a, cfg, stopping) has CFI with respect to the set of allowed
indirect jumps J if, for any execution starting from initial state
s0 and producing a trace s0 → . . .→ sn, either (1) the whole
trace has CFI according to Definition A.1, or else (2) there is
some i such that si →n si+1, and (si, si+1) 6∈ cfg J , where
the sub-traces s0 → . . .→ si and si+1 → . . .→ sn both have
CFI and the sub-trace si+1 → . . .→ sn is stopping.
At the abstract and symbolic levels a trace is stopping if it
is formed only of attacker steps (→a) between states that are
all stuck with respect to normal steps ( 6→n). This definition
expresses the fact that the attacker can take steps even after a
violation has occurred and the machine has halted with respect
to normal steps. At the concrete level the attacker can even take
steps while the machine is halting; this is discussed together
with the concrete machine for CFI.
Abstract CFI Machine The abstract machine has CFI by
construction. It has separate instruction and data memories
(im and dm); the instruction memory is fixed (NWC), and all
executed instructions are fetched from this memory (NXD):
im[pc] = i decode i = Store rp rs reg[rp] = p
reg[rs] = w dm′ = dm[p←w]
(im, dm, reg, pc, true)→n (im, dm′, reg, pc + 1, true)
(STORE)
Machine states contain an additional bit ok. The machine
executes instructions only when this bit is true; otherwise
it gets stuck with respect to normal steps (the attacker can
take steps at any time). Indirect jumps are checked against the
allowed set J ; if the control flow is invalid the jump is taken
but the violation is recorded by setting ok to false so that the
machine will now be stuck with respect to normal steps. This
behavior is designed to match rule-based enforcement at lower
levels, thus simplifying the proofs (we can prove a 1-backward
SA-simulation instead of a {0, 1} one).
im[pc] = i decode i = Jal r reg[r] = pc′
reg′ = reg[ra←pc+ 1] ok = (pc, pc′) ∈ J
(im, dm, reg, pc, true)→n (im, dm, reg′, pc′, ok)
(JAL)
While the CFI micro-policy does not provide any monitor
services itself, the abstract machine fully exposes (“paravirtu-
alizes”) the lower-level monitor service mechanism—that is,
the abstract machine can be instantiated with an arbitrary set
of monitor services.
get service pc = (f, ti)
f(im, dm, reg, pc, true) = (im, dm′, reg′, pc′, true)
(im, dm, reg, pc, true)→n (im, dm′, reg′, pc′, true)
(SVC)
As in all other step rules, we proceed only when the ok bit is
true, which prevents monitor service calls outside the allowed
CFG.
The step rules above capture the intuition of a machine that
has CFI by construction. With the exception of the rule for
Load, the remaining rules are straightforward; we show just
the ones for Load and Bnz:
im[pc] = i decode i = Load rp rs
reg[rp]=wp im[wp]=w ∨ dm[wp]=w
reg′ = reg[rs←w]
(im, dm, reg, pc, true)→n (im, dm, reg′, pc + 1, true)
(LOAD)
mem[pc] = i decode i = Bnz r n reg[r]=w
pc′ ← if w = 0 then pc+1 else pc+n
(im, dm, reg, pc, true)→n (im, dm, reg′, pc′, true)
(BNZ)
Notice that the Load rule allows loading a word from either
the instruction or the data memory, capturing the intuition that
instructions can be loaded as data. The disjointness of the two
memories (and thus the fact that the rule is deterministic) is
guaranteed by the simulation relation between the symbolic
and the abstract machine. The step rule for Bnz demonstrates
the fact that we only check indirect jumps, not direct ones, for
control-flow violations.
Proving CFI for this abstract machine is easy. We capture
the attacker’s capabilities by the following relation:
dom dm = dom dm′ dom reg = dom reg′
(im, dm, reg, pc, ok)→Aa (im, dm′, reg′, pc, ok)
This allows the attacker to arbitrarily change the data memory
and registers at any time. Finally, the only requirement on
initial states is that the ok bit starts out true.
Theorem A.3 (Abstract CFI). This abstract machine has CFI.
Symbolic CFI Machine The symbolic micro-policy for CFI
was described in §6. For completeness, we present the rest
of the symbolic rules. The case for Jump is identical to Jal.
For the other operators (besides Jump, Jal or Store), we again
have one rule to deal with the case of a jump target...
(src, dst) ∈ J
op : (Code src,Code dst,−,−,−)→ (Code ⊥,−)
... and a different one when execution did not take a jump:
op : (Code ⊥,Code ,−,−,−)→ (Code ⊥,−)
We capture the symbolic-level attacker by the relation
mem→Sa mem′ reg→Sa reg′
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc)→Sa (mem′, reg′, wpc@tpc)
where the relation on memories and registers is the pointwise
extension of the following inductive relation on atoms:
w1@Data→Sa w2@Data w@(Code id)→Sa w@(Code id)
This allows attackers to change words tagged Data but not
words tagged Code and not the tags themselves.
Two properties are invariant under execution: all words in
memory tagged Code addr are indeed located at address addr,
and all sources and destinations in J are tagged Code addr. A
symbolic machine state is initial if it satisfies these invariants
and the pc is tagged Data (no jump in progress).
Concrete Machine To obtain a useful result about CFI on
the concrete machine, it is not enough to simply instantiate the
generic refinement result from §9, as we do for other policies;
we must first define concrete versions of each concept used
in the statement of the CFI property. The concrete attacker is
only allowed to take steps when the machine is in user mode.
It can change memory and registers but not the contents of the
cache, the pc, or the fpc.
mem→Ca mem′ reg→Ca reg′
(mem, reg, cache, pc, fpc)→Ca (mem′, reg′, cache, pc, fpc)
The attacker relation for memories and registers directly extends
the symbolic one to the additional low-level tags
w1@ut1 →Sa w2@ut2 decR(m, cti) = uti
w1@ct1 →Ca w2@ct2
and similarly for decM. This allows the concrete attacker to
change atoms tagged User ut for some symbolic tag ut under
the same conditions as at the symbolic level, but prevents it
from changing any other atoms (in particular monitor code,
data, and registers) or any tags. This attacker model relies
on the correctness of the monitor self-protection mechanism
from §9.
The initial states at the concrete level are defined as the
image under ≈CSI of symbolic initial states that additionally
satisfy our symbolic invariants. This ensures that concrete
initial states satisfy both the generic low-level conditions from
§9 (Iw) and that they respect the symbolic invariants.
A concrete trace is stopping if it has a (possibly empty) prefix
formed only of attacker steps between user states that are all
stuck with respect to user steps, followed by a (possibly empty)
suffix of monitor states. This captures either immediately
getting stuck with respect to normal steps or missing in the rule
cache, faulting into the monitor, and eventually halting without
returning from monitor mode. This definition also deals with
the fact that we allow the attacker to take steps even after a
violation has occurred but before the machine is halted (right
before the fault into the miss handler).
The cfg function is defined so that in monitor mode all
control flows are allowed. We assume that monitor code is
correct, so we do not need to enforce CFI there.
Formal Results We prove CFI for the concrete machine
running a CFI monitor by transporting CFI from the abstract
machine to the symbolic and then to the concrete one using a
general CFI-preservation result.
Theorem A.4 (CFI Preservation). Given a high-level ma-
chine MH = (StateH , initialH ,→Hn ,→Ha , cfgH , stoppingH),
a low-level machine ML = (StateL, initialL,→Ln ,→La , cfgL,
stoppingL), a simulation relation between states sL ∼ sH , a
predicate checked sL1 s
L
2 indicating which low-level steps need
to be checked for CFI, and a set of allowed indirect jumps J ,
if MH has CFI, then ML also has CFI under the following
additional assumptions:
A1. 1-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for checked steps
in →Ln ;
A2. {0, 1}-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for
unchecked steps in →Ln ;
A3. 1-backward simulation with respect to ∼ for attacker steps
(→La );
A4. if initial sL, then ∃sH so that initial sH and sL ∼ sH ;
A5. if sL1 ∼ sH1 , sL2 ∼ sH2 , checked sL1 sL2 , then
cfgH J = cfgL J ;
A6. if sL1 ∼ sH1 , sL1 →n sL2 and ¬checked sL1 sL2 , then
(sL1 , s
L
2 ) ∈ cfgL J ;
A7. if sL1 ∼ sH1 , (sH1 , sH2 ) 6∈ cfgH J , and sH1 →n sH2 then
¬(sH1 →a sH2 );
A8. and if sL1 ∼ sH1 , checked sL1 sL2 , (sH1 , sH2 ) 6∈ cfgH J , and
sH1 → sH2 , and the trace sL2 :: tL refines the trace sH2 :: tH
with respect to simulation relation ∼, and stopping (sH2 ::
tH), implies that stopping (sL2 :: t
L).
Assumption A3 states that low-level attacker steps (→La ) are
simulated by corresponding high-level attacker steps, which
ensures that the low-level attacker is at most as strong as the
high-level one. A4 enforces that all low-level initial states can
be mapped to related high-level initial states. A5 ensures that for
checked low-level steps the two cfg functions completely agree.
A6 states that all unchecked low-level steps are allowed by cfgL
(e.g., monitor steps are allowed by the CFG). A7 states that
CFG violations are not simultaneously attacker steps. Finally,
A8 ensures that a high-level stopping trace can only be mapped
by the simulation relation to a stopping low-level trace.
Theorem A.5 (CFI Concrete). The concrete machine running a
CFI monitor satisfying the assumptions in §9 has CFI.
B Additional Symbolic Machine Rules
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Nop
transfer(Nop, tpc, ti,−,−,−) = (t′pc,−)
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(NOP)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Const w r
reg[r]= @t
transfer(Const, tpc, ti, t,−,−) = (t′pc, t′)
reg′ = reg[r←w@t′]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(CONST)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Mov r rd
reg[r]=w@t reg[rd]= @td
transfer(Mov, tpc, ti, t, td,−) = (t′pc, t′d)
reg′ = reg[rd←w@t′d]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(MOV)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Load r rd
reg[r]=w@t mem[w] = w′@t′ reg[rd]= @td
transfer(Load, tpc, ti, t, t′, td) = (t′pc, t
′
d)
reg′ = reg[rd←w′@t′d]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, (wpc+1)@t′pc, extra)
(LOAD)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Jump r
reg[r] = w′pc@t
transfer(Jump, tpc, ti, t,−,−) = (t′pc,−)
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, w′pc@t′pc, extra)
(JUMP)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Bnz r n
reg[r] = w@t
transfer(Bnz, tpc, ti, t,−,−) = (t′pc,−)
w′pc = if w = 0 then wpc + 1 else wpc + n
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, w′pc@t′pc, extra)
(BNZ)
mem[wpc] = i@ti decode i = Jal r
reg[r] = w′pc@t1 reg[ra] = @tra
transfer(Jal, tpc, ti, t1, tra,−) = (t′pc, t′ra)
reg′ = reg[ra←(wpc+1)@t′ra]
(mem, reg, wpc@tpc, extra)→ (mem, reg′, w′pc@t′pc, extra)
(JAL)
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